

# ChirpKey: A Chirp-level Information-based Key Generation Scheme for LoRa Networks via Perturbed Compressed Sensing

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## Outline



Background

**Challenges** 

**Our** solution

**Experiment results** 

**Conclusion & future work** 


LoRa applications

#### 3/25

### 🖵 Long Range (LoRa)

Background

- ✤ One of the most representative low power wide area communication technologies
- Features low power and long range
- ✤ It is critical to ensure secure communications



#### Urban smart grid



#### Smart metering



#### Street light





#### Smart parking









#### □ Pre-shared key in LoRa

- Used to encrypt and decrypt messages between the end device and the network server
- ✤ Not flexible, scalable, and can be easily stolen by malicious attackers






Pre-shared key in LoRa

# Background



#### **Physical-layer key in LoRa**

- Extract randomness from wireless channel based on channel reciprocity
- Existing methods are still inefficient and unstable due to low data rate of LoRa








#### Coarse-grained and noisy channel measurement

- Packet RSSI (RSSI<sub>p</sub>) provides coarse-grained channel information
- ✤ Register RSSI (RSSI<sub>r</sub>) attempts to improve granularity but still **noisy**




Resulting in impaired channel reciprocity





#### □ Inefficient quantization process

- **Lossy and error-prone** conversion of channel measurements into binary bits
- Increased packet exchanges



Lossy and error-prone quantization process


### Resulting in system inefficiency and lack of robustness

# **Our solution**



ChirpKey—A Chirp-level Information-based Key Generation Scheme for LoRa Networks via Perturbed Compressed Sensing

- ✤ LoRa-specific chirp-level channel measurement
- Perturbed compressed sensing based key delivery method



























































#### System overview (((יןי)) Channel **Channel State** Perturbation Random Key Alice Probing Estimation **Matrix Generation** Compression REQ Syndrome $\left(\left( \left( \left( \mathbf{x}^{\prime}\right) \right) \right)$ Channel **Channel State** Perturbation Bob Probing **Estimation Matrix Generation** 0100101 \* \* ((1)) Alice Bob ((†))

×

















### **1** LoRa-specific chirp-level channel measurement

2 Perturbed compressed sensing based key delivery method




ChirpKey work-flow



### Chirp-Level Signal Strength Indicator (CLSSI)


- ✤ A LoRa packet is composed of multiple chirps with a constant transmitting amplitude
- Calculate the fine-grained changes of received chirps
- Fine-grained chirp-level channel state indicator





#### **Channel state estimation**

- ✤ Alice and Bob send Probing packets in a half-duplex manner
- Complete channel information requires Alice to combine with Bob's CLSSI
- Use a lightweight univariate spline fitting to estimate the missing CLSSI




**Channel State Estimation** 



### **1** LoRa-specific chirp-level channel measurement

### **2** Perturbed compressed sensing based key delivery method




ChirpKey work-flow



#### **Compressive sensing theory**

- Efficiently acquiring and reconstructing sparse signals
- ✤ Multiplying the sparse signal by a measurement matrix for compression
- Solving an optimization problem for reconstruction




**Compressive sensing** 



### □ Perturbed compressive sensing (PCS)

- Efficiently acquiring and reconstructing sparse signals with noise tolerant ability
- Multiplying the signal by a measurement matrix with noise for compression
- Solving an optimization problem for reconstruction




Perturbed compressive sensing



### □ Perturbed compressive sensing (PCS)-based key generation

- Based on the PCS theory, the compressed key from Alice can only be reconstructed by Bob if their measurement matrices' difference is within the noise tolerance ability for PCS
- How to construct the perturbed measurement matrices of Alice and Bob and make their difference within the tolerance of PCS?
- Use their similar CLSSI values to generate similar perturbed measurement matrix!




**PCS-based key delivery** 



### Perturbed measurement matrix generation

- Generate **default sensing matrix**  $A_0$  (use random Gaussian matrix to generate)
- Construct  $f(\hat{S}_A)$  with cyclic displacement to form structured matrix perturbation
- ✤ Generate **perturbed matrix** :  $A_a = A_0(I + E_a)$ , where *I* is identity matrix, and  $E_a = f(\hat{S}_A)$  is generated circulant matrix



Perturbed measurement matrix generation

#### □ Secret key compression

- ✤ Alice generates random binary sequence
- ✤ Calculate compressed vector
- Send compressed vector through public channel to Bob



Secret key compression








#### □ Secret key reconstruction

- ✤ Bob receive the compressed vector
- **\diamond** Reconstruct the key by solving  $\ell_1$  -regularized total least-squares problem



# **Experimental settings**




#### Data collection

- Three USRP N210 SDR with WBX Daughterboard as Alice, Bob, and Eve
- Indoor and outdoor experiments with static and mobile node settings

### Metrics

- Key agreement rate: the percentage of bits matching between two keys generated by two devices
- Key generation rate: the average number of agreed keys generated from the samples per second



Indoor experiment


**Outdoor experiment** 

# **Experiment results**



#### Comparison with state-of-the-arts


- ✤ LoRa-key uses RSSI channel measurement and compressed sensing-based reconciliation
- ✤ LoRa-liSK uses RSSI channel measurement and error correction code-based reconciliation
- ✤ Gao et al. uses register RSSI channel measurement and compressed sensing-based reconciliation
- Vehicle-key uses register RSSI channel measurement and autoencoder based reconciliation



# **Experiment results**

### □ Security analysis

- Eavesdropping attack
- ✤ Imitating attack
- Predictable channel attack



#### **Given States** Key Randomness

- Use the NIST set of statistical tests
- P-values show the randomness level
- P-value>0.1 indicate high randomness

TABLE II: NIST test.

Test	Static Indoor	Mobile Outdoor	Static Indoor	Mobile Outdoor
Freq.	0.502	0.941	0.725	0.775
Block Freq.	0.321	0.743	0.709	0.757
Cumsum (Fwd).	0.621	0.821	0.609	0.802
Cumsum (Rev).	0.475	0.743	0.744	0.687
Runs.	0.917	0.089	0.492	0.121
Longest Run of 1's.	0.155	0.349	0.669	0.811
Approx. Entropy.	0.998	1.000	0.999	1.000
FFT.	0.281	0.293	0.541	0.729
Serial.	0.766	0.329	0.124	0.623

#### Key randomness




## **Experiment results**



#### **Energy consumption**

- Implement ChirpKey on a single board Raspberry Pi
- Use power monitor to evaluate the computation time and energy consumption



System implementation

#### TABLE III: Computation overhead.

User Performance	Computation time (ms)		Energy consumption (mJ)	
Stage	Alice	Bob	Alice	Bob
Channel variance estimation	1.98	0.22	7.843	-
Compression/reconstruction	0.0108	198	0.0713	-
Total	1.9908	198.22	7.9143	-

#### **Energy consumption**

## **Conclusion & future work**



□ We propose a fast and secure LoRa physical-layer key generation method— ChirpKey, which addresses two key limitations in existing work.

ChirpKey can run real-time in current mobile devices and incur low system overhead.

Future work will be focused on PCS-based secret key generation for large group LoRa nodes.

# Thank you!

